Temporal Becoming and the A- and B- Theories of Time :: Philosophy Philosophical Time Papers

Temporal Becoming and the A- and B- Theories of Time It is interesting to note that many of Saint Augustine's concerns about time around 400AD are the same as we have today. For example, Augustine was puzzled about the nature of the distinction between the past, the present and the future. He was also concerned about the nature and status of the apparent flow of time. In this essay we will consider a much more recent approach to time that came to the fore in the twentieth century. In 1908 James McTaggart published an article in Mind entitled 'The Unreality of Time', in which, as the title implies, he argued that there is in reality no such thing as time. Now although this claim was in itself startling, probably what was even more significant than McTaggart's arguments was his way of stating them. It was in this paper that McTaggart first drew his now standard distinction between two ways of saying when things happen. In this essay we shall outline these ways of describing events and then discuss the merits and demerits of each, and examine what has become known as the 'tensed versus tenseless' debate on temporal becoming. One way which we speak, experience and conceive of time is that time is something that flows or passes from the future to the present and from the present to the past. When viewed in this way, events which are present have a special existential status. Whatever may be the case with regard to the reality or unreality of events in the future and the past, events that are in the present exist with a capital 'E'. It can then be postulated that it is the 'present' or 'now' that shifts to even later times. If events in time (or moments of time) are conceived in terms of past, present and future, or by means of the tenses, then they form what McTaggart called the A-series (from which the A-theory of time is derived). This type of change is commonly referred to as 'temporal becoming', and gives rise to well known perplexities concerning both what does the shifting and the type of shift involved, which we will discuss later. On the other hand, we experience events in time as occurring in succession, one after another, and as simultaneous with other events. When viewed in this way, events stand in various different temporal relations to each other but no one event, or set of events, is singled out as having the property of being present or as occurring 'now'.